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 National symbols as signs of unity and division
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he oneness of nations  
 innate quality in human beings, neither is it acquired 
hat 
 Dane, a 
hile this pedagogical work is carried out in all states, it is done more 
explicitly 
                                                
T
National identity is not an
naturally as one grows up. Like any other identity, national identity has to be 
learned. Important instruments in any learning process are various kinds of 
audiovisual aids, and so also in the school of national identity construction. T
is why national symbols—flags, coats of arms, national anthems—play such a 
crucial role in nation-building and nation-maintenance. Moreover, national 
symbols are interactive aids through which the students can participate 
themselves. The people who are learning how to acquire an identity as a
Frenchman, or  an Australian are invited not only to watch the Danish, French, 
and Australian flag from afar, but to carry it in their hands, participate in flag 
parades, in flag hoisting ceremonies.  
 
W
and systematically in some countries than in others. A particularly 
explicit strategy for patriotism-training by means of national symbols can be 
found in a statement published by the Central Propaganda Department of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1996 entitled ‘Teach the General Public and 
 
1 The author wishes to thank Jan Oscar Engene, Stefan Troebst, Ole Kristian Grimnes, and 
Iver Neumann for very helpful comments and suggestions to draft versions of the article. 
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Especially the Young to Love the National Flag and the National Anthem’.
it is explained that ‘the national flag and national anthem are symbols of a 
nation’s sovereignty and dignity and concentrated expressions of its patriotic 
spirit’. (‘Teach the General Public’ 1996) Another vivid example of such iden
learning is the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag that is carried out in schools all 
over the USA every morning throughout the entire school year. The words of thi





pledge allegiance to the flag, 
, 
stands, 





of the United States of America
and for the Republic for which it 
one nation under God, indivisible,  
with liberty and justice for all. 
 
W
differ, but to my mind it is one of the small, inconspicuous words so 
easily overlooked, namely 'one'. More than anything else, the pledge celebrates
the unity of the American nation. In order to make this point abundantly clear, it 
is repeated and reinforced with the addition of the word 'indivisible'. In terms of 
ethnic background, country of origin, religion, and phenotype, the American 
nation is anything but homogeneous. Even so, the vast majority of the citizens
the United States today do see themselves as one nation. This is evident not least 
through their attitude towards the flag.  
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In the 1940s, the obligation to participate in the flag ceremony was a 
matter of controversy. In 1940, the Supreme Court ruled that students should be 
required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools, but in a new ruling 
only three years later the Court reversed this decision. (The History of America’s 
National Symbols’).  From the viewpoint of effective nation-building this was 
probably a wise decision. Had the pledge remained mandatory it would have 
become a welcome target for antistate demonstration, for instance in the 
rebellious 1960s.The ceremony of the Pledge of Allegiance would have 
contributed far  less to the maintenance of national unity and instead been turned 
into a possible rallying point for opposition and dissent.  
 
The Pledge of Allegiance ceremony may at the same time be described 
as routine, trite and ineffective, on the one hand, and as a success story, on the 
other. Both assessments are in a sense equally true. Many of the pupils 
participating in the ceremony no doubt couldn't care less about the words they are 
uttering, or even worse, while uttering them continue to believe that 'no, our 
nation is not one of liberty and justice, it is illiberal and unjust’. But through such 
a rejection of the official ideology such rebellious youngsters reveal that they 
nevertheless have taken on board the notion that there is one specific nation on 
earth called the American nation and they have internalized their membership in 
it ('"Our" nation is not...'). By rejecting the specific positive attributes ascribed to 
this nation, they confirm and reinforce the most important message of the school 
pledge: the essence of the nation, which is its oneness. Their action—
participation in a ritual that celebrates the unity of the nation—is far more 
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constitutive of the national community as such than whatever thoughts they may 
harbor about this nation.  
 
The dividedness of the nation in new states 
Despite the crucial role symbols play in the formation of national unity few 
theoreticians of nationalism devote much attention to this phenomenon. Two 
authors who do discuss this topic are Anthony Smith and Michael Billig (Smith 
1999;  Billig 1995). Both of them contribute with important insights but both at 
the same time misrepresent and underestimate the difference between symbolic 
nation-building in old states and newly established states.  
 
Anthony Smith calls his  theory ‘ethno-symbolism’ and treats the 
symbols of the nation as part of the ethno-cultural heritage which modern 
nationalists can make use of to forge a national unity and identity. This function 
symbols fill alongside the myths, values, and memories of the group. Smith 
assumes that national symbols derived from mythical ethno-history will be 
unifying not only in established nation-states, but also in new and fragile 
multicultural states.  
 
Even those new state-nations in Africa and Asia that sought to turn ex-
colonies into territorial nations must forge a cultural unity and identity 
of myth, symbol, value, and memory that can match that of nations 
built on pre-existing ethnic ties, if they are to survive and flourish as 
nations. It is this ethnic model of the nation that has proved most 
influential (Smith 1999, 13, emphasis in the original).  
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 No doubt state leaders in new states often  follow the ethnic model of 
nation-building, but, as I argue below, this is not the only possible solution, and 
normally not the best one in order to survive and flourish as nations. Symbols that 
are rooted in a cultural past will more often than not be more divisive than 
unifying since different ethnic and political groups often hark back to different 
pasts. Symbols taken from political history or even created from scratch may in 
fact fulfill the function of unifying the nation just as well, or better, than can 
ethnic symbols. If traditions can be ‘invented,’ then certainly also symbols can 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992). 
 
In Banal Nationalism (1995) Michael Billig analyses what he sees as 
creeping 'banal' nationalism in the United States, the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and other states that he describes as the 'established nations.' These are 
states that 'have confidence in their own continuity'. The basic difference between 
these nations and unestablished nations on the symbolic level, Billig claims, is 
one between 'the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building' and 'a flag which 
is being consciously waved with fervent passion'. (Billig 1995, p. 8). Massive and 
fervent flag waving certainly takes place in the United States as well these days, 
more so than in many other states, so the difference between the function of the 
flags in established and unestablished states cannot lay here. The crucial 
difference, in my view, is that in new, insecure nations the flags and other 
national symbols often fail to fulfill their most important function as promoters of 
national unity. Quite to the contrary, they often bring to the fore strong divisions 
within the putative nation.  
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 The reasons behind the frequent failures of national symbols in new or 
newly reestablished states are several. One is resources. New states normally are 
weaker than established states, institutionally  and economically. Another reason 
is that the national symbols of new states have to fulfill a much more difficult 
task. They must not only keep alive, but create a national identity and an 
allegiance to a state that did not exist before.  
 
Cornelius Castoriadis has maintained that in today's world, the flag is 'a 
sign ... that one can and must die for and what sends shivers down the spine of 
patriots as they watch the military parade pass by'.(Castoriadis 1987, p. 131) To 
produce such shivers among the on-lookers may be a less daunting task than it 
sounds like if the state leaders can assume, as Castoriadis seems to do, that the 
people are already patriots when they turn out to watch the military parade. 
Leaders of new states, however, cannot assume anything like that. Their task is 
precisely to create such patriotism.  
 
In this article I will contrast the unificatory vs. divisive potential of 
national symbols in one new state (Bosnia)2, one newly reconfigured state 
(Russia), and one established nation-state, Norway. I will not discuss such 
national symbols as capitals, currencies, postal stamps, monumental buildings, 
national heroes and the like, even though they often play very important roles. 
Instead, I will concentrate on the three most central symbols; the flag, the 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the function of national symbols in two other new states, Macedonia and 
Belarus, see Kolstø 2003.  
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national anthem and the coat of arms. In the three states under scrutiny we see 
disputes over national symbols unfolding along several axes: among ethnic 
groups; among socio-ideological groups; and among groups with different 
attitudes towards other states and supranational organizations.  
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: an artificial flag for an artificial state? 
The establishment of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state in 1992 was 
highly contentious. With 43 per cent Muslims (Bosniaks), 30 per cent Serbs and 
17 per cent Croats and 10 per cent other, the state had no majority population. 
From the very beginning the leaders of the Serb community vehemently opposed 
the proclamation of independence, and threatened to take up arms should it 
happen. As is well known, this was no empty threat.  
 
 
Figure 1: Flag used by Muslim military units during the Bosnian war 
 
The Bosnian leaders fully realized that if their state should have any 
chance to survive it had to be proclaimed as a supraethnic state, and not be 
associated by any one ethnic group in particular. This was reflected in the choice 
of state flag and state coat of arms in 1992. During the war many Muslim military 
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units used a green-white flag with a crescent as their standard (see Figure 1), and 
many wanted the crescent, or at least the green color, to be represented also in the 
state flag. The Bosnian leadership, however, desperate not to provoke the Serbs 
and the Croats, decided against this solution. Instead, it opted for a design based 
on a mediaeval Bosnian symbol, the fleur de lis (See Figure 2). This was the coat 
of arms of the Bosnian Kotromanic dynasty, and at first glance seemed to be a 
most felicitous choice. The lily symbol hailed from the pre-Ottoman period and 
represented no particular ethnic group. In 1376, the Kotromanic ruler Stefan 
Tvrtko had proclaimed himself King of the Serbs, Bosnia and the Coastland, and 
later added to his title 'King of Dalmatia and Croatia.' In this way all major 
groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina could see themselves as represented by the flag. If 
any symbol could manage to unite the fragile Bosnian nation it should be a 
symbol dating from a period prior to present-day ethnic divisions in Bosnia, or so 
one would assume. But this was not fated to happen.  
 
 
Figure 2: Bosnian fleur de lis 
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During the 1992-1995 war the Croats and the Serbs fought under their 
ethnic symbols. The Croats used the checkerboard and the Serbs often a 
Yugoslav flag with a Serbian cross adorned by four Cyrillic letters 'C' (see Figure 
3). The letters, or fire rakes, are given several interpretations, but most commonly 
they are said to be an acronym meaning 'Only the Serbs will Save Serbia,’ or 
'Only Unity will Save Serbia.’ The state flag with the lilies was used only by the 
Muslims. As a result, this originally civic, supraethnic flag was closely associated 
with one of the warring parties, and in a sense 'ethnicized'. The flag that had been 
deliberately designed as a symbol of unity became a sign of division and discord.  
 
 
Figure 3: Flag used by many Serbian military units during the Bosnian 
war 
 
After the signing of the Dayton agreement in December 1995 it was 
clear that another flag and coat of arms had to be found in order to piece together 
war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina into something resembling a united nation. In the 
summer of 1997 the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina began to work on the flag 
issue, but failed to agree on any of the proposals presented. The Serbian deputies 
in particular had a tendency to vote against all suggested solutions. There is 
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reason to believe that many of them did this not so much because they objected to 
any particular details in the draft design, but simply in order to deny legitimacy to 
the state as such.  
 
In December 1997, a Peace Implementation Conference for the Dayton 
Agreement in Bonn, Germany, commission the International High Representative 
in Bosnia, Carlos Westendorp, to work out a compromise solution on the flag 
issue by the end of the year. If no solution could be found through parliamentary 
procedures, the High Representative was authorized to enforce the adoption of 
any flag he saw fit. As the parliamentary deliberations stalled once more, 
Westendorp appointed an independent flag commission composed of 
representatives of all three ethnic groups. The commission was told to work in a 
speedy fashion, as the Olympic Winter Games would start in Nagano in Japan on 
7 February. It would be a very bad signal to send to the world if the Bosnian 
troop would enter the stadium with no flag. 
 
The starting point for the flag commission was that the flag had to be 
equally acceptable to all citizens and groups in the country. When the flag 
designers in 1992 had gone back into history to look for unifying symbols, it had 
not worked, and this time the commission decided to look in the opposite 
direction, so to speak. They decided on a future-oriented design that did not draw 
on the traditions of any group or any period in the history of country. The three 
solutions they presented to the parliament were all very stylized, consisting of 
stripes, stars, and triangles. (see Figure 4, 5, and 6) The triangle could be 
interpreted as a stylized shape of the country, while the stars resembled the stars 
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of the European Union, as did the deep blue background color.3 Colors that were 
associated with a particular ethnic group, such as green for the Muslims and red 








Figure 5 New Bosnian flag commission by Carlos Westerndorp, Draft 2. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Originally, the background color had been light blue as in the flag of the United Nation, but 
this was later changed to 'European' blue. In both cases the color was intended to underscore 
Bosnia's belonging to the international community of states.  
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 Figure 6 New Bosnian flag commission by Carlos Westerndorp, Draft 3 
 
None of the three proposed designs, however, got the necessary 
number of votes in the parliament to be adopted, and Westendorp did what he had 
warned he would do: he imposed the flag which had received the highest number 
of votes (based on Figure 5). This was intended as an interim solution and the 
imposed flag would function as the Bosnian state flag until the Bosnian 
parliamentarians were able to agree on another one.  
 
At a press conference presenting the new flag, a spokesperson of the 
High Representative's office declared that 'this flag is a flag of the future. It 
represents unity not division; it is the flag that belongs to Europe'.4 The danger, 
however, is that it conveys an impression not so much of unity as of artificiality. 
The flag in many ways looks like a logo of a commercial firm. In fact, when I 
first saw it outside a building in Sarajevo I did not immediately understand that it 
was the country's state flag I was looking at. Many people, even among the 
Muslims, found it difficult to relate to the strange-looking, foreign-imposed state 
flag of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The day after the adoption of Bosnia's flag a group 
of Bosniak intellectuals, led by the renowned anti-nationalist philosopher 
Muhammed Filipovic, signed a collective letter in which they declared that the 
imposed flag was 'the final way to kill the nation'.5 
 
                                                 
4 Duncan Bullivant, as quoted by ‘The semiotics of confusion’. 
5 Printed in The Times (London), 5 February 1998, as quoted in Poels 1998, p. 9-12. 
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In Republika Srpska the flag of Bosnia-Herzegovina is used very little. 
Instead, the flag of the Bosnian-Serbian entity is prominently displayed. This flag 
is very similar to the Yugoslav flag, only with the horizontal stripes are arranged 
in a different order, with red on top, blue in the middle and white on the bottom, 
in effect a silent, constant reminder of the long-term wish of the Banja Luka 
leadership to unite with this country. Also in the other entity of the Republic, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian state flag must compete for 
attention with other flags and state symbols. Both the Federation and the ten 
cantons that it is composed of have their own flags and coats of arms. In contrast 
to the state coat of arms, the coat of arms of the Federation is based on traditional 
heraldic conventions,6 and conspicuously displays symbols of the two ethnic 
groups, the Muslims and the Croats (see Figure 7). The circle of stars beneath the 
two ethnic symbols represents the ten cantons, but clearly also mimics the flag of 
the European Union, although the stars are differently designed.  
 
                                                 
6 It has, however, been faulted for poor heraldic handicraft. The two shields on the top have 
different design, one pointed and one rounded at the bottom, and this creates an asymmetrical 
impression. See ‘Flags Of The World: Bosnia and Herzegovina’. 
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 Figure 7: Coat  of arms of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The Federation flag depicts the coat of arms on the middle field of a 
green-white-red tricolor. Green and red are the colors of the Muslims and the 
Croats, respectively, while white supposedly symbolizes peace and accord 
between them.7 At the level of cantons symbolic ethnization is brought even one 
step further: Most of the Croat cantons display the checkerboard, sometimes to 
the exclusion of other symbols. Likewise, Bosniak cantons use the fleur de lis 
(but not the crescent). 
 
                                                 
7 This solution strongly resembles the structure of the Indian flag and may well have been 
inspired by it. In the Indian flag the Hindus are represented in the top stripe 
 by safran yellow and the Muslims by the color green at the bottom. The white color in the 
middle symbolizes peace and accord between them. See Virmani 1999. This deliberate 
attempt to make it easier for members of all groups to identify with the Indian state, however, 
did not prevent its violent partition in 1947. 
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In this fierce competition for attention the Bosnian state flag has one 
major advantage over its challengers: only this flag may be used to represent the 
country abroad at international conferences and sports tournaments. While the 
composite parts of the United Kingdom—England, Scotland, Wales—are allowed 
to participate in UEFA cups under their own flags, no such symbolic sovereignty 
has been granted to the entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This means that to the 
extent that Bosnian athletes make it to the winners' block in Olympic Games and 
World Cups, it will be the Westendorpian flag that will be hoisted behind them 
and the Bosnian state anthem that will be played. Such uplifting moments, to the 
extent that they take place, will associate these state symbols with excellence, 
pride and 'good feeling'. Whether this is sufficient to create a high degree of 
emotional attachment to these symbols among the people they are supposed to 
represent, remains to be seen. Circumstantial evidence from the last years—such 
as the state flag on small stickers in the window of taxi-cabs and on flagpoles 
outside gas-stations—suggests that the Westendorpian flag may indeed slowly be 





Russia: Putin's composite compromise 
Russia is not a new state in the same sense as Bosnia is. In 1991, Russia was 
recognized as the successor state of the Soviet Union and even inherited this 
state's seat in the UN Security Council. Even so, there is a sharp rupture between 
the USSR and Russia in many respects, politically, ideologically and territorially. 
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Symbolically, this break has been signaled through the introduction of new state 
symbols, including a flag, coat of arms, and national anthem. For a long time, 
however, these symbols remained hotly disputed. The Russian case, therefore, 
shows that a deep crisis of symbol politics may erupt not only in a brand new 
state, but also in a reconfigured state.  
 
In 1990—that is, more than a year before the break-up of the Soviet 
Union—demonstrators in Russia began to wave the white-blue-red tricolor during 
anti-communist street rallies. Even though the tricolor had been one of the flags 
of the tsarist Russian state, it was not considered a symbol of Tsarism, but of pro-
western orientation. Under the Romanovs the white-blue-red tricolor had been 
used primarily by the merchant fleet, and it was not directly associated with the 
tsarist regime as such. Moreover, after the February 1917 Revolution, it was used 
by the Provisional government of Aleksandr Kerenskii, and primarily for that 
reason it was rejected by Russian nationalists during perestroika. 
 
During Word War II the white-blue-red tricolor had been used by the 
Russian Liberation Army (ROA) under renegade Soviet General Andrei Vlasov, 
and, if for no other reason, this made it totally unacceptable for Russian 
communists and nationalists with left-wing leanings. They continued to use the 
Soviet red flag with its hammer and sickle.  Finally, Russian tsarists and  other 
right-wind nationalists flew a black-gold-white flag, which had been the flag of 
the dynastic flag of the Romanov familiy. This means that any Russian could 
easily signal which of the three main camps of Russian politics he or she 
sympathized with—right-wing tsarists and imperialists, centrist nation-builders, 
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and left-wing Soviet patriots—simply by hoisting the appropriate flag. The new 
Russian state authorities were confronted not by one, but two nostalgias: one 
going all the way back the tsars and one stopping at the commissars. 
 
When the Yeltsin administration took over the offices in the Kremlin 
on 25 December 1991, the red flag with the hammer and sickle was lowered from 
the masts on its turrets and replaced by the white-blue-red tricolor. This was now 
the de facto Russian state flag, but it had not been explicitly adopted as such by 
the parliament. Likewise, the pre-revolutionary double-headed eagle was 
introduced as the state coat of arms but without any formal sanction.  
 
An attempt to secure such sanction in January 1998 ended in utter 
failure. The Duma was asked to pass into law the new state symbols currently in 
use—flag, state coat of arms, and national anthem. The national anthem was 
taken from Mikhail Glinka’s opera 'A life for the tsar' (in the Soviet period 
known as 'Ivan Susanin,' after its main hero), composed in 1836. The melody 
was little known, had no lyrics, and was difficult to hum. Less than one-fourth 
of the 450 members of the Duma voted in favor of each of these symbols, while 
the majority wished to retain the symbols of the Soviet era.  
 
A proposal to reintroduce the Soviet anthem adopted during World 
War II was, however, also defeated—and the proposal to bring back the hammer 
and sickle had been voted down during an earlier session of the Duma. Finally, 
Yeltsin decided to take the questions of state symbols off the political agenda and 
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authorized their use by a presidential decree. For the duration of his incumbency 
Russia remained a state without unifying, generally recognized national symbols. 
 
During the nine of years of Yeltsin's presidency his popularity and 
authority was gradually eroded, and during the last years of his reign he was for 
all practical purposes a lame duck. With this paralysis of the political center the 
Russian regions—the so-called Subjects of the Federation—were free to assert 
themselves to the point that some began to act almost as states within the state, 
carrying out nation-building projects of their own (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2004)8.  
 
Only with the election of Yeltsin's successor in the spring of 2000 did 
Russian politics gain a new impetus, and outstanding issues could again be 
addressed. Putin's political profile was extremely vague, but he managed to build 
up a tremendous personal popularity and from that position he began to court the 
various factions in Russian politics and rebuild a political consensus. As a part of 
this endeavor he decided to reopen the vexed issue of state symbols.  
 
As was the case in Bosnia it appears that it was the athletes’ need for 
usable national symbols that forced the issue to the top of the political agenda. 
The immensely popular Spartak Moscow soccer team complained to Putin that 
the Glinka song was impossible to sing and claimed that this situation had led to 
‘a loss of morale and dip in form’. (‘Russia at a loss for words’ 2000). At the 
Sydney Olympics in fall 2000 the Russian medallists stood awkwardly in silence 
                                                 
8 For a display of the flags of Russia’s constituent republics, see 
www.theodora.com/wfb/russia/russia_flags.html#MORE 
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while their national anthem was played (Russia took no less than eighty-eight 
medals, including thirty-two gold medals). In this situation, a special commission 
under the leadership of St. Petersburg governor Vladimir Yakovlev was 
appointed to select a new national anthem (‘What Should Russia's National 
Anthem Express?’ 2000). The commission examined eight different tunes, 
including one promoted and performed by the famous pop star Alla Pugacheva. 
In the end it decided to readopt the Soviet anthem that had been composed by 
Aleksandr Aleksandrov in 1936 and adopted as the Soviet state anthem in 1944.9 
This anthem was voted over in the Duma on 8 December 2000. An overwhelming 
majority of the deputies supported the motion, which was passed with 381 against 
51 (‘Russia proposes bill’ 2001). 
 
A national contest was announced for the lyrics and no less than 6,000 
texts submitted. The commission decided on a version written by one of the two 
authors of the original song, Sergei Mikhalkov. The eighty year old former 
Stalinist had dropped all references to communism and socialism but retained a 
number of words and phrases strongly reminiscent of his Soviet time version, 
particularly in the refrain. A bill on the news lyrics was passed in the Duma in 
March 2001 with 345 votes for, nineteen against, and one abstention. (‘Russian 
Duma agrees’ 2001) 
 
The adoption of the new national anthem was part of a package that 
included also a settlement on the flag issue and an agreement on the coat of arms. 
Taken together, it combined symbols preferred by the Westernizing democrats 
                                                 
9 Between 1936 and 1944 this melody had been the anthem of the Bolshevik Party.  
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and Tsarist emblems favored by Slavophile nationalists, while also retaining 
some of the attributes of Soviet power so dear to the Communists. The white-
blue-red tricolor was finally accepted as the state flag of the Russian Federation, 
while the Soviet red flag became the official flag of the Russian Armed Forces. 
Finally, the double-headed eagle became the coat of arms of the Russian state but 
in new colors: in the tsarist version, there was a black eagle against a golden 
background, while in the new arms the eagle is depicted in gold against a red 
background.  
 
The national flag was passed in the Duma with 342 of 450 votes, and 
the coat of arms with 341. Prominent left-leaning politicians such as Gennadii 
Ziuganov and Gennadii Seleznev supported the bills. The only dissenting voices 
came from the extreme left, on the one hand, and Westernizing liberals in 
Yabloko and the Union of Rightist Forces, on the other. The liberals pointed out 
that in the mind of many Russian citizens ‘the Stalin anthem’ was closely 
associated with bloody crimes against the nation. Yabloko chairman Grigorii 
Yavlinskii claimed that a national anthem should be ‘a symbol of the unity of the 
state’, but the adoption of the Aleksandrov tune represented ‘a step towards a 
split in society’. (‘Grigory Yavlinsky’ 2000; ‘Yabloko and the SPS oppose 
restoration’ 2000). This view was supported by a group of famous Russian 
cultural figures in a collective statement published in Izvestia on 5 December 
2000. They claimed that ‘the debate on the anthem has already split a nation in 
which the process of reconciliation and consolidation had begun.’ (RFE/RL 




Figure 9: Coat of Arms of the Russian Federation 
 
 
Some Russian and Western scholars also adhere to this view. American 
political scientist Kathleen Smith claims that Putin’s attempt to have the best of 
both worlds with the national anthem—keeping the form while changing the 
content—is unlikely to have the desired effect. Rather than end the battle over 
what to take from the past, ‘it simply reaffirmed the deep divisions among the 
Russian people’ (Smith 2002, p. 184). Russian political commentator Lilia 
Shevtsova concurs: ‘With his insensitivity and his obtuseness, the president gave 
new life to old divisive passions and reopened old wounds.’ (Shevtsova 2003, p. 
145)  
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This harsh judgment is not entirely convincing. In addition to the 
overwhelming support the symbols received in the national parliament, it was 
clearly favored also by the population at large. Opinion polls showed that the 
Soviet-time anthem was by far the most popular among the ones that were 
considered for adoption: while only 15 percent wanted to retain the Glinka’s 
song, roughly 50 percent favored a return to the Soviet anthem (‘Russia at a loss 
for words’ 2000). It is difficult to see which other solution could have mustered 
as large, or larger, support among the Russian citizens. To have no national 
anthem at all was not an option.  
One particular detail of the solution to the national symbols issue, 
however, was clearly unfortunate from the point of view of promoting national 
unity. The new Russian law on state symbols requires people to stand at attention 
during the playing of the anthem. This injunction turned the ceremony into an 
opportunity for ostentatious civil disobedience. According to Lilia Shevtsova, a 
joke soon went around that ‘if you don’t stand up on time, you’ll do time’. ‘At 
every official function, some would stand and others would remain seated or 
pretend to be tying their shoelaces. At least for the foreseeable future, it would be 
a constant reminder of the schism in Russian society’ (Shevtsova 2003, p. 146). 
It is tempting for national leaders to make obeisance to the national 
symbols a mandatory duty for the entire population, but as part of a nation-
building project such a strategy will probably be counter-productive. As 
Shevtsova suggests, it will  all too easily highlight dissent rather than unity in the 
nation. As noted above, this danger was apparently perceived by American legal 
authorities in the 1940s,  when participation in the flag ceremony in American 
schools was made voluntary. 
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Norway: Can national symbols become signs of division in an established 
nation-state? 
Is the divisive potential of national symbols limited to new states only, or is it 
conceivable that national symbols can split a country's population also in 
established nation-states? They no doubt can, but I will nevertheless in this 
section make three claims: 1) such instances are relatively rare; 2) the ferocity of 
symbol disputes in established nation-states, while sometimes quite intense, 
normally does not reach the same high-pitched levels as one may find in new and 
newly reconfigured states; and 3) when the political conflict that engendered the 
controversy subsides in an established nation-state, the flag, national anthem and 
other disputed symbols will soon revert to their normal position as signs of unity 
and concord. 
 
To substantiate these claims I will present some material from 
Norwegian 20th century history. On two different occasions —in the 1920s and in 
the 1970s—a politization of the Norwegian flag was politicized in such a way 
that it could conceivably have led to a permanent split in the population. While 
sentiments ran high on both occasions, however, hostility eventually subsided, 
and a broad-based national consensus and an overarching collective identity was 
reestablished. The flag resumed its position as a universally accepted symbol of 
the Norwegian nation that all political and social groups could relate to.  
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In the second half of the 19th century Norway went through a period of highly 
successful nation-building. A national history was written, national heroes 
identified, national costumes constructed and standardized, and national cultural 
and political institutions put in place (Sørensen 2001). At that time, Norway was 
ruled from Stockholm in a dual monarchy under the Swedish king, but in June 
1905 the Norwegian parliament unilaterally abrogated the Union. When the 
Swedes grudgingly accepted this fait accompli, full political independence was 
achieved. In a nation-wide referendum the same summer a staggering 99.98 
percent voted in favor of separation from Sweden. A monolithic and endurable 
national unity had been established, or so it seemed. 
 
However, only some fifteen years later the Norwegian nation was torn 
apart by a deep rent in the national fabric when a strongly radicalized working 
class clashed with the politically dominant bourgeoisie. This socio-political 
schism was potentially destabilizing for the entire political system and was 
played out in a number of different arenas, including the arena of national 
symbols.  
 
Ever since the 1820s, the day of the adoption of the17 May 1814 
Constitution has been celebrated as one of the most potent expressions of 
Norwegian national identity (Jor 1980; Aarnes 1994). On that day, citizens' and 
children's parades are organized in all towns and cities, and particularly the latter 
have since their inception gained immense popularity. In these parades the 
children and their parents dress in their very best suit or dress—often a national 
costume—and sing the national anthem and other patriotic songs while they 
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cheerfully wave the national flag. In the 1920s, however, the Socialists came to 
perceive the 17th of May celebrations as a concoction of the class enemy. In his 
memoirs Einar Gerhardsen—one of the leaders of the Labor party at the time 
later to become Norway’s longest-serving prime minister—recalled that 'both the 
Norwegian flag and the national anthem were regarded as bourgeoisie 
symbols…. [The Socialists] had the red flag which symbolized solidarity across 
national borders, they had the International as their own battle song' (Gerhardsen 
1974, p. 351). The Socialists therefore began to boycott the official 17th of May 
celebrations and hold their own rival events instead, both on the international Day 
of Labor, 1 May, and on 17th of May.  
 
In order to win over the masses for their arrangements the Socialists 
copied important parts of the bourgeoisie arrangement, such as children’s 
parades. Like the children in the official 17th of May parades, the children in the 
Socialist demonstrations sang songs and waved flags—only the songs were 
revolutionary marches and the flags unicolor red. 10 The competition of parades 
became particularly harsh in 1924, a year marked by massive and drawn-out 
labor conflicts. In an editorial in Arbeiderbladet (The Workers’ Gazette)—one of 
the leaders of the Labor Party remarked that ‘the bitter and protracted war 
between the poor workers and the rich employers has with sufficient clarity 
                                                 
10 Remarkably, contemporary photographs show that many of the children in the Socialist 
parades were dressed in national costumes! Apparently the national costume, based as it was 
on the peasant Sunday dress, was not regarded as 'bourgeoisie' or reactionary in the same way 
as the national flag and anthem were. 
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brought home the message that there is no longer a united people behind the 17th 
of May.’ (Martin Tranmæl  as quoted in Aaby 2001, p. 199). 
 
The length of the various children’s parades was used as a yardstick to 
gauge the popular strength of each political faction. (Unsurprisingly, both sides 
claimed to have won.) A historian of this conflict concludes that in 1924, ‘the 
children’s parade was no longer an innocent symbol of unity or the foremost 
representation of the national community. The significance of the parade had 
changed: it had been turned into a powerful means of political expression’ (Aaby 
2001, p. 201). While the symbolic competition in the following years was 
somewhat less intense, the symbolic stand-off nevertheless continued into the 
mid-1930s. Only in 1936-37 was the symbolical gap finally closed when the 
children of the workers began to participate in the official 17th of May parades 
together with their better-to-do coevals (while many of children from working 
class homes continued to march in the 1st of May demonstrations as well.) It is 
worth noting that this national reconciliation process took place only after the 
first Labor government of any duration had been formed in 1935.11 At this stage 
the labor movement had shed its revolutionary rhetoric and become a normal 
political player with vested interests in the established socio-political system. 
This means that the closing of the ranks on the level of symbols came about only 
after the social split had been healed. It was not so much a cause as an effect of 
greater political harmony. 
 
                                                 
11 Another Labor government had been established already in 1928, but lasted less than a 
month.  
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The final societal and national reconciliation between the left and the 
right took place under the impact of a common, external threat: the Nazi 
occupation of Norway 1940-45. The flag—along with the King's monogram and 
some other patriotic emblems—became the most important symbol of resistance. 
When the Germans forbade 17th of May celebrations, this further enhanced the 
value of the flag as a mobilizing symbol. 
 
Post-war Norway has been marked by a high degree of political stability and 
social harmony. In a period characterized by rising living standards for all groups 
only a few issues have had the potential to split the nation. Foremost among them 
has been the question of EEC/EU membership. In two referenda—in 1972 and 
1994—the majority of the population voted against joining this European 
organization, both times with a very narrow margin. The issue has not been laid 
to rest, and continues to agitate popular debate as few other issues do.  
 
During the 1972 campaign the 'No'-movement made open use of 
national and nationalist themes and symbols. The movement was dominated by 
the political center/left; while nationalism in the interwar period had been 
associated with the political right, it had now migrated towards the opposite pole 
of the political spectrum. Remarkably, the most leftist faction in the broad and 
heterogeneous 'No' –movement, the Maoist Workers' Communist Party (AKP), 
played on nationalist sentiments more unabashedly than any other group.  
 
The logo of the largest anti-EEC organization, ‘The People’s 
Movement’ (Folkebevegelsen), consisted of stripes of red, white, and blue 
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arranged in the same order as in the Norwegian flag. (see figure 10) This symbol 
was ubiquitous and adorned virtually all of their posters, banners, and leaflets. 
The People’s Movement also used the national flag itself extensively at their 
meetings and other arrangements. Some of their demonstrations were strongly 
reminiscent of 17th of May parades, with long columns of flag bearers in front 
(see figure 11). While few, if any, activists would think of themselves as 
nationalists, in terms of symbols nationalism had nevertheless clearly become the 
only game in town. The best evidence of this is that the Yes-movement also 
decided to use the three national colors in their logo. Rather than leave the 
national symbols entirely to the opponent, the Yes-movement, albeit hesitatingly 




Figure 10 ‘Vote No! to UNION’      Figure 11 ‘No to EEC’ demonstration in  
              the main street of Oslo 
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 Figure 12 The logo of the ‘Yes to EEC’-movement  
 
At the same time, both sides tried to portray their opponent as a traitor 
to the national cause. One ‘Yes’-activist denounced the Maoists’ usage of the flag 
in the anti-EEC campaign as sheer opportunism and hypocrisy: ‘Even though 
they least of all care about the integrity of our land, they more than all other 
groups insist on the need to preserve full national self-determination… 
Temporarily infatuated with the three national colors they waive the Norwegian 
flag from morning until late at night.’ (Lassen 1972) Conversely, activists on the 
No-side insisted that membership in the European community would be 
tantamount to a sellout of national sovereignty and dignity. A graphic expression 
of this message was the painting 'Norwegian Neo-Romanticism' by pop-artist 
Rolf Groven, which famously combined a number of crucial themes in the anti-
EEC propaganda: the perceived threat of rural depopulation; fear of pollution and 
industrialization; the menace of an allegedly rising German eagle; and, last but 
not least, the loss of national independence represented by the defamation of the 
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flag.(see Figure 13)12 This painting hit a raw nerve. When the artist tried to sell 
posters with this motif in down-town Oslo, he was arrested by the police for 
allegedly defiling the flag, the same offense he himself insisted that his 
ideological opponents were guilty of.13  
 
                                                 
12 The two politicians sitting in close embrace atop the lowered flag are the leaders of the two 
largest pro-EEC parties, the Conservative party (Høyre) and the Labour party. These 
ostensible political foes were allegedly caught in the act of conspiring against the 
independence of their own country. 




kreves for å se dette bildet.
 
Figure 13: Rolf Groven 'Norwegian Neo-Romanticism' (1972) 
 
 
During the next campaign over membership in the EU, in 1994, many 
of the arguments and slogans seemed like a mere replay of the 1972 campaign. 
On the level of symbols, however, something had clearly changed. Compared to 
the situation twenty two years earlier, nationalist slogans and national emblems 
were used more sparsely. This is not to say that they had disappeared entirely but 
they did not dominate public iconography in the same way. Rolf Groven painted 
 31
another deliberately insulting anti-EU canvass—portraying the leaders of the 
Yes-side together with Helmut Kohl as a bunch of Bacchanalians feasting on a 
table covered by the Norwegian flag as a table cloth.(‘Rolf Grovens Nettgalleri’) 
In contrast to Groven’s 1972 painting, however, his  new canvass failed to stir 
passions and was largely passed over in silence. No longer the only game in 
town, nationalism had in the eyes of many become discredited, and could not 
function as a successful mobilizing strategy. Part of the explanation for this was 
clearly that, after the breakup of the USSR and in particular after the bloody wars 
of Yugoslav succession, nationalist symbols carried very different and far more 
sinister associations even in the Norwegian context.14 In this way, developments 
in new states in Eastern and Southern Europe could influence the function of 
national symbols in an established nation-state in another part of the continent.  
 
After the victory in the 1994 referendum, an MP from the vehemently 
anti-EU Centrist party proposed to make the day of the referendum, 28 
November, an official flag day. The idea did not catch on, however, not even 
among ardent ‘No’ activists. As a possible explanation behind their skepticism 
one Norwegian sociologist has suggested that: 
 
the flag is a symbol of struggle only in times of war. In times of peace 
it shall be a unifying symbol. In terms of the interests of the No-
movement it would probably have been a miscalculation to make this 
day an official flag day. That would have made the flag a symbol of 
                                                 
14 Author’s conversation with Ingvild Næss Stub, information manager in ‘The Europe 
Movement,’ Oslo 2 June 2004.  
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division rather than a unifying symbol which the No-movement could 
control and play out again in times of crisis (Aagedal 1997, p. 527). 
 
If this is a precise rendering of the strategy of the ‘No’-movement on 
the flag issue, it would reveal a remarkable, even cynical, willingness to exploit 
the national symbols for partisan purposes. It would also suggest an interesting 
dialectical relationship between the flag as a partisan weapon in domestic 
struggles and the flag as a national symbol: in order to keep its sharpness as a 
political weapon the flag must, paradoxically, retain its character as a generally 
recognized symbol of national unity.  
 
There are strong reasons to believe that since 1994 the mobilizing 
potential of the national flag in the EU struggle has continued to decline. In the 
current latent phase of this struggle, when both sides are warming up to a future 
third referendum that seems ever more likely, neither movement uses the national 
symbols to any noticeable degree. While spokespersons of both the ‘No’ and 
‘Yes’-movement point out that they have not yet made any final decisions on 
logo and campaign profiles,15 it is remarkable that the national colors are 
completely absent from the current version of the logo and information material 
of both movements. The flag seems to have reverted to its unifying position 
above the political fray.  
 
 
                                                 
15 Author’s interviews in the headquarters of the ‘No’-movement and the ‘Europe 
Movement,’ Oslo 2 June 2004.  
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Conclusions 
Some conclusions, I believe, may be drawn from the cases analysed above. As all 
symbols are arbitrary, there can be no ‘natural’ flags or other national symbols. 
By the same token, there can be no artificial ones either, since the concept of 
artificiality presupposes the existence of a non-artificial variety of the same 
specimen.  
 
Since there are no inherent qualities in state symbols that prevent them 
from being accepted, and likewise, no particular design and details will in and of 
themselves guarantee their success. The divisiveness vs. unifying potential of 
new state symbols is first and foremost a function of whom they are being 
associated with and how they are being exploited politically. If a symbol or a 
design is seen as belonging to one political or ethnic group more than others, it 
will be extremely hard to get the other groups and parties in the country to accept 
it as their own. This is not to say that symbols create divisions in society. In most 
cases the order of cause and effect is the opposite: The divisions in society come 
first, and disagreements over state symbols are a function of these divisions. 
However, some symbols are easier to attack for their alleged divisive qualities 




Symbol politics is more about politics than about symbols. But, as the 
Russian case illustrates, this also means that a way may be found out of a 
symbolic deadlock when the political climate changes, and when all major parties 
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conclude that there is more to be gained by seeking compromise than to continue 
the war of symbolism. A compromise may take many different forms. As the 
Russian case suggest, the solution does not have to be aesthetically or artistically 
consistent, and can well be a collage of seemingly disparate elements.  
 
Normally when national symbols are employed as a weapon in a 
political struggle, the symbolic strife is triggered by groups who unfurl an 
alternative flag, either ethno-territorial separatists, as in Bosnia, or anti-
nationalists, as in Norway in the 1920s. Occasionally, however, as the Norwegian 
EU-struggles in the 1970s and 1990s show, state-oriented nationalists may also 
take the initiative to a politicization of national symbols. For state-oriented 
nationalists, however, it will in the long run be self-defeating to pursue a political 
strategy that threatens to tear apart the nation (as they perceive it). In any case the 
national symbols of established states seem to be robust enough to retain, or 
regain, their position as unifying symbols also after episodes when they have 
been exploited for partisan political purposes. 
 
In the beginning, a national symbol for a new state will, inevitably, 
always be regarded as novel and unfamiliar. However, the flags of today's 
consolidated nation-states were also at one point new and 'artificial'. Since there 
are no inherent qualities in any symbol that link it emotionally or cognitively to 
the entity which it symbolizes, this linkage has to be learned. If the Bosnian flag 
seems more artificial today than most other flags, it is primarily because Bosnia is 
still at the very start of the learning process.  
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Certain important psychological mechanisms facilitates the job of 
symbolic nation-builders. The first is what has been called the 'normative force of 
what actually is.' (Arvidsson and Fogelklou 1984, p. 34) By this expression is 
meant that alternatives which actually exist have a kind of ontological upper hand 
over hypothetical alternatives. This can serve as an important source of 
institutional and state legitimacy. The national symbols that were discarded will 
gradually fade from memory (unless some opposition groups with high visibility 
go on using them), while the ones that are adopted will be displayed all over the 
landscape and the citizens will constantly be reminded of them. Gradually they 
will grow accustomed to them.  
 
In new states that manage to survive their infancy period nation-
building will gradually fade into nation-maintenance. While nation-building and 
nation-maintenance are closely related as stages of the same process, the latter is 
normally a far easier task than the former. In an established nation-state not only 
the state itself, but also its main institutions and symbols will be taken for granted 
in a way that is not the case in new states. 
 
A national compromise can never satisfy all protagonists, and nation-
builders will normally try to win over, first and foremost, the centrist ‘silent’ 
majority and turn a deaf ear to the clamor of vociferous fringe groups. In today’s 
Russia, the most pro-Western liberal-democratic parties, the Union of Rightist 
Forces and Yabloko, are increasingly regarded as fringe phenomena. Their 
dissent is therefore not likely to influence the priorities of the Kremlin or the 
attitudes of the population at large. Lilia Shevtsova, as we saw, claims that 
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controversy over the new-old Russian national anthem will continue to split the 
Russian nation ‘in the foreseeable future’. If we accept her prognosis, the 
prospects for the intermediate and long term future may still be less bleak. As a 
national flag and anthem gradually gain acceptance in a population those 
politicians who continue to make a point of not respecting them will be branded 
as anti-patriots. Their demonstrative actions will only have the effect of driving 
them into deeper isolation. The original motivation behind their protest—such as 
solidarity with the victims of Stalinism—will be largely forgotten and their point 
be lost on the public. Since there is no inherent linkage between a symbol and 
what it symbolizes the linkage between them cannot only be learned, but also ‘de-
learned’ or forgotten. 
 
Another powerful psychological mechanism that may boost the 
prestige of national symbols is Pavlov's 'law of association'. If state symbols can 
be linked to events and situations that the citizens psychologically associate with 
pride, joy, and high spirits, these good feelings may rub off on the flag and other 
national symbols and enhance their emotional value. The most obvious way 
through which this is done is participation in international sports events. Even 
though few if any may feel anything special about a newly designed flag, many 
will come to feel a lump in their throats and tears in their eyes when, as the 
national flag is slowly raised and the national anthem played, the top athletes of 
the nation ascend the winners' block at international sports tournaments. 
Whenever that happens few people will ask about the  ethnic, ideological, or 
social membership of  the athletes. In such situations, the athletes do not 
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